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APPROACHES TO THE QUESTION  
‘WHAT IS LIFE?’: RECONCILING THEORETICAL 
BIOLOGY WITH PHILOSOPHICAL BIOLOGY
Arran Gare
AbstrAct: Philosophical biologists have attempted to define the distinction between life and 
non-life to more adequately define what it is to be human. They are reacting against idealism, 
but idealism is their point of departure, and they have embraced the reaction by idealists against 
the mechanistic notion of humans developed by the scientific materialists. Theoretical biologists 
also have attempted to develop a more adequate conception of life, but their point of departure 
has been within science itself. In their case, it has involved efforts to overcome the reductionism 
of scientific materialism to develop a form of science able to identify and explain the distinctive 
characteristics of living beings. So, while both philosophical biologists and theoretical biologists 
are struggling to overcome scientific materialism, they are approaching the question: What is 
Life? from different directions. Focussing on the work of Robert Rosen, I will try to show what 
revisions in our understanding of science theoretical biologists need to accept in order to do 
justice to the insights of the philosophical biologists. I will suggest that not only will this involve 
major revisions in what we understand science to be, but that scientists must accept that science 
is indissociable from natural philosophy, and that to properly comprehend life mathematics must 
ultimately be subordinated to stories. 
Keywords: Philosophical Biology, Theoretical Biology, Life, Biosemiotics, Process Philosophy, 
Robert Rosen, Hans Jonas, Jacob von Uexküll, Max Delbrück, C.H. Waddington, F.W.J. 
Schelling, C.S. Peirce.
INTRODUCTION
In the foreword to his influential work The Phenomenon of  Life, Hans Jonas wrote:
[T]he following investigations seek to break through the anthropocentric confines of idealist 
and existentialist philosophy as well as through the materialist confines of natural sciences. 
… The great contradictions in which man discovers in himself – freedom and necessity, 
autonomy and dependence, self and world, relation and isolation, creativity and morality 
– have their rudimentary traces in even the most primitive forms of life, each precariously 
balanced between being and not-being, and each already endowed with an internal horizon 
of “transcendence.” We shall pursue this underlying theme of all life in its development 
through the ascending order of organic powers and functions: metabolism, moving and 
desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind – a progressive scale of freedom 
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and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer 
sees himself in metaphysical isolation.1
In Chapter One of his influential work Mind from Matter?, Max Delbrück, after quoting 
a diary entry from Søren Kierkegaard ridiculing the idea that scientists could see how 
consciousness came into existence by staring through a microscope, wrote:
In this essay I propose, and propose seriously, to do that ridiculous thing, “look through the 
microscope,” to try to understand how consciousness or, more generally, how mind came 
into existence. And with mind, how language, the notion of truth, logic, mathematics, and 
the sciences came into the world. Ridiculous or not, to look at the evolutionary origins of 
mind is no longer an idle speculation.2
Both Jonas and Delbrück were concerned to reject Cartesian dualism. They both op-
posed a conception of physical existence that makes mind unintelligible, and struggled 
to develop a conception of life which could make intelligible human life and mind. Al-
though they emphasised different features of human existence, with Jonas focussing on 
emotion and freedom and Delbrück on the development of rational thought, they were 
both concerned to trace the development of life from its most elementary to its most 
complex forms. They covered much the same ground. 
However, their points of departure were quite different. Jonas, a student of Martin 
Heidegger, began with efforts by hermeneutic phenomenologists to characterize human 
existence and then looked for the first glimmerings of such characteristics in nature. His 
work is grounded in the humanities. Delbrück, originally a quantum physicist, began with 
the evolution of the cosmos and recent developments in physics, biology and psychology 
to show how human capacities emerged from the physical world. His work is grounded 
in the sciences. Jonas is a foremost representative of a tradition of philosophical biology 
and Delbrück is a foremost representative of a tradition of theoretical biology. In this 
paper I will look at how these traditions have converged to supplement the insights of 
each other. 
Each of these traditions has its strengths and weaknesses. The strength of the 
tradition of philosophical biology is that it draws on a long tradition of thought on 
the nature of human consciousness and experience, revealing dimensions of existence 
beyond the comprehension of mainstream science. The strength of the tradition of 
theoretical biology is that it utilizes the tradition of scientific inquiry into physical, 
biological and cognitive processes characterized by more rigorous conceptualization 
and testing of ideas, enabling humans to be comprehended in the much broader context 
of modern cosmology. The problem then is to reconcile these two traditions. I will 
argue that to fully integrate these traditions it is necessary to draw on the tradition 
of natural philosophy going back to the work of Herder, Goethe and Schelling. This 
     1. Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of  Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology, Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1966, p.ix.
     2. Max Delbrück, Mind from Matter?, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p.21.
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was a tradition concerned to characterize the nature of physical existence to undercut 
the opposition between idealism and realism, spiritualism and materialism. It is the 
tradition of process metaphysics and includes Charles Sanders Peirce, Henri Bergson, 
Alfred North Whitehead and Ludwig von Bertalanffy. I will argue that it is through this 
metaphysics that it becomes possible to fully appreciate the advances in the sciences of 
the theoretical biologists while making sense of the insights of the philosophical biologists. 
In this way it provides the basis for overcoming the opposition between the sciences and 
the humanities and thereby to appreciate what it means to be free conscious agents as 
part of and creative participants within a dynamic, creative nature.
THE TRADITION OF PHILOSOPHICAL BIOLOGY
Modern philosophical biology emerged under the influence of Edmund Husserl 
and phenomenology, with deeper influences going back to Kant, and beyond Kant to 
Aristotle. To understand philosophical biology fully it is necessary to understand it in 
relation to Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl had set out to develop a presupposition-
less science of experience, a science more primordial than the natural sciences since 
every other science could be mapped as only one of a number of domains of experience. 
While Husserl inspired a revolution in philosophy, many of Husserl’s disciples became 
disaffected as he developed his philosophy in a more idealist direction. Husserl claimed 
that it was possible to bracket out all assumptions of existence and then examine how 
experiences acquired the accent of reality. The turn to philosophical anthropology and 
philosophical biology was a way of rejecting this idealist turn. However, those who took 
this turn maintained their appreciation of Husserl’s achievements. They also took over 
his critical attitude towards the development of mathematical physics, and embraced 
ideas from neo-Kantianism and hermeneutics that Husserl had assimilated to his phe-
nomenology and the Aristotelianism that Husserl had taken over from Franz Brentano. 
Going further than Husserl in this regard they revived Aristotle’s biological notions, 
taking over Aristotle’s distinction between and characterization of the vegetative, the 
animal, and the human ‘psyche’. They retained Husserl’s project of investigating experi-
ence and the insights gained from this, however, and insisted on recognizing a central 
place of experience, particularly the complex structure of temporal experience and the 
experience of embodiment, in at least some of the components of nature.
  Philosophical biology was developed to provide a foundation for philosophical 
anthropology, the effort to answer the Kantian question ‘What is Man?’. Max Scheler’s 
book Man’s Place in Nature exemplified this. To develop his conception of humans Scheler 
began with plants, characterizing them as the ‘vegetative’ aspect of life. While acknowl-
edging their lack consciousness and sensation, his concern was to characterize plants 
as having proto-experience from which higher forms of experience could develop. He 
wrote of the plant, ‘its existence fulfils itself in nourishment and growth, in reproduc-
tion and death, without any specific life-span for the species. Yet we find in the plant the 
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original phenomenon of expressiveness.’3 He continued: ‘The rich variety of forms in the 
leafy parts of plants suggests, even more impressively than the forms and colours in ani-
mals, that the principle at the unknown roots of life may act in accordance with fanciful 
play, regulated by an aesthetic order.’4 He went on to argue that the ‘first stage of inner 
life’ is ‘present in all animals and also in man.’5 This vital feeling underlies ‘that primary 
experience of resistance which is the root of experiencing what is called “reality”’ which, 
claimed Scheler, is the origin of consciousness.6 This then provided Scheler with the 
basis for defining humanity.
A major source of ideas for these early philosophical biologists was Jacob von 
Uexküll. Influenced by both Kant and Husserl, von Uexküll argued that to understand 
animals it is necessary to appreciate their surrounding worlds (their Umwelten), that is, 
what in their environment has meaning for them.7 Husserl’s collaborator, Heidegger, 
influenced by von Uexküll, used his conception of organisms as inseparable from their 
worlds to develop his conception of human existence as temporally structured Being-
in-the-World, claiming that ‘the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is 
world-forming.’8 
Although from a different perspective, F.J.J. Buytendijk and Helmuth Plessner also 
rejected the imposition of traditional Cartesian assumptions onto the experience of 
living beings, arguing: 
The body and its forms of movement, different for each biological species, form a 
unity of which one can neither say that it is physical nor that it is mental. It lies on 
neither of these two planes of reality, but is not therefore less real. … The forms of 
(animal) movement are forms of behaviour, since they carry visibly in themselves 
and ‘delineate’ the relation of the body to the environment and conversely of the 
environment to the body.9 
Building on his early work with Buytendijk, Plessner went on to characterize life as 
‘taking a position in relation to the world,’ rather than being simply an effect of it. He 
then characterized humans in terms of their eccentric positionality, embodied beings 
who do not completely coincide with their embodied existence.10 
The French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty drew on the work of Scheler, 
Heidegger and Butendijk to develop his concept of life. He observed that:
We speak of vital structures … when equilibrium is obtained, not with respect to 
     3. Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature [1928], trans. Hans Meyerhoff, N.Y.: Noonday Press, 1968,  p.12.
     4. Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, p.13.
     5. Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, p.13.
     6. Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, p.14.
     7. See Jacob von Uexküll, Theoretical Biology, trans. D.L. MacKinnon, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. Ltd, 1926. On von Uexküll’s Husserlian background, see Han-liang Chang, ‘Semiotician or 
hermeneutician? Jacob von von Uexküll revisited’ Sign System Studies 32.1/2, (2004): 115-138.
     8. Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of  Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William Mc-
Neill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p.185.
     9. F.J.J. Butendijk and H. Plessner, “Die Deutung des mimischen Ausdrucks,” Philosophischer Anzeiger, Bern: 
Francke Verlag, 1925, p.83, trans. and cited by Grene, Approaches to a Philosophical Biology, p.124.
     10. Grene, Approaches to Philosophical Biology, p.75ff.
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real and present conditions, but with respect to conditions which are only virtual 
and which the system itself bring into existence; when the structure, instead 
of procuring a release from the forces with which it is penetrated through the 
pressure of external ones, executes a work beyond its proper limits and constitutes 
a proper milieu for itself.11 
This provided a starting point to develop a conception of humans as historically situated, 
incarnate consciousnesses ‘being-to-the-world’. 
It was against the background of such work that Jonas sought to promote and ad-
vance philosophical biology, reviving Aristotelian thought, advancing this through the 
insights of phenomenology to oppose Cartesian thought. The language of mathematical 
physics fails when confronted with the sentience of one of the most elementary forms of 
life, the amoeba, he argued: 
[T]he amoeba is part of the universe and must be accountable by it for its creative 
principle. Its minuteness is no disability in ontological relevance. Its intrinsic 
evidence, as one creation, forms part of the general evidence and must be heard 
all the more as in this instance “intrinsic” has a fuller meaning than applies to any 
other class of cosmic beings: it includes the fact of its own, felt inwardness.12
Life, he claimed, is characterized by three basic features. First, it is a metabolism with 
a double aspect, ‘denoting on the side of freedom, a capacity ... to change its matter, 
... [while] equally the irremissible necessity for it to do so.’ Second, it must attain this 
matter from outside itself. It must thereby be ‘turned outward and toward the world 
in a peculiar relatedness of dependence and possibility’ thereby referring ‘beyond its 
given material composition to foreign matter as needed and potentially its own.’ Third, 
‘there is an inwardness or subjectivity involved in [this] transcendence, imbuing all the 
encounters occasioned in its horizon with the quality of felt selfhood, however faint its 
voice.’13 
Philosophical biology waned along with the influence of phenomenology.14 How-
ever, their program of research was continued by ethologists. Konrad Lorenz and W.H. 
Thorpe both attempted to characterize the worlds of different organisms, from the 
most primitive organisms to humans.15 Such work has continued up to the present.16 
This work has been further advanced by biosemioticians and biohermeneuticists, both 
strongly influenced by the work of von Uexküll.17 Thomas Sebeok, Jesper Hoffmeyer 
     11. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of  Behaviour, [1942] trans. Alden L. Fisher,  Boston: Beacon Press, 
1963, p.145f..
     12. Jonas, The Phenomenon of  Life, p.65.
     13. Jonas, The Phenomenon of  Life, p.83f.
     14. Marjorie Grene in a recent book on the history of the philosophy of biology discussed none of the 
thinkers she looked at in Approaches to Philosophical Biology. See  Marjorie Grene and David Depew, The Phi-
losophy of  Biology: An Episodic History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
     15. See Konrad Lorenz, Behind the Mirror: The Search for a Natural History of  Human Knowledge, trans. Ronald 
Taylor, London: Methuan, 1973; W.H. Thorpe, Animal Nature and Human Nature, London: Methuan, 1974.
     16. See for instance Marc Berkoff, Minding Animals: Awareness, Emotions, and Heart, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2003.
     17. See Kalevi Kull and Toomas Tiivel (eds), Lectures in Theoretical Biology 2, Talinin: Estonias Academy 
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and Kalevi Kull among others have reformulated such work through the semiotics of 
C.S. Peirce, whose work was also devoted to transcending Cartesian dualism.18 Kull, 
following Martin Krampen, extended Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt to plants. More re-
cently, Sergey Chebanov, Anton Markoš and Gunther Witzany have developed herme-
neutic characterizations of life.19 Markoš summed up the deep conviction underlying 
this whole tradition of philosophical biology when he wrote in conclusion to his book 
Readers of  the Book of  Life:
I strongly believe that an organism cannot be defined solely in terms of 
thermodynamics, biochemical, and information magnitudes. If we want to 
understand the difference between living beings and machines (however 
complicated), then meaning (i.e. an internal interpretation of the situation, not 
forced on us from outside) should become the central focus of our interest. It is 
here that, in my opinion, the border between the living and the non-living, lies.20 
THE TRADITION OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
Delbrück began his career as a theoretical physicist engaged in developing quan-
tum theory before turning to biology. He did so under the influence of Niels Bohr. Bohr, 
whose father was a biologist, was deeply interested in biological problems, and like other 
figures involved in the early development of quantum theory, expected that having pen-
etrated the innermost secrets of matter the ‘secrets of life’ would tumble forth as corol-
laries of this work.21 In a lectures ‘Light and Life’ first published in 1932, and ‘Biology 
and Atomic Physics’ first published in 1937 Bohr outlined the philosophical implications 
for the life sciences of the changes brought to the notion of natural law by quantum 
theory.22 Bohr had provided an interpretation of quantum theory that allowed different 
theoretical frameworks to function as complementary. Having allowed complementary 
theories in physics, he argued that it is necessary to give a place to a diversity of theo-
retical frameworks in grasping reality. In particular, he argued that biology should not 
be treated through the theoretical frameworks developed within physics but should give 
a place to theoretical frameworks appropriate to grasping the characteristics of life. Just 
as Scheler’s work stimulated a number of philosophers, biologists and psychologists to 
of Sciences, 1993, and Marcello Barbieri, Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis, Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2007.
     18. See Jesper Hoffmeyer, Signs of  Meaning in the Universe, trans. Barbara J. Haveland, Bloomington: 
Indianan University Press, 1996. See also the special edition of Semiotica devoted to Jacob von Uexküll, 134 
(1), (2001).
     19. See Sergey V. Chebanov, ‘Biology and humanitarian culture: the problem of interpretation in bio-
hermeneutics and in the hermeneutics of biology’ in Kull and Tiivel (eds), Lectures in Theoretical Biology, 
pp.219-248; Anton Markoš, Readers of  the Book of  Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; and Günther 
Witzany, Life: The Communicative Structure: A New Philosophy of  Biology, trans. Michael Stachowitsch, Books on 
Demand Gmbh, 2000.
     20. Markoš, Readers of  the Book of  Life, p.221.
     21. See Robert Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p.8f.
     22. Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, New York: John Wiley, 1958, pp.1-12 & 13-22.
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grapple with the question What is life?, Bohr’s work inspired a number of physicists as-
sociated with the development of quantum theory to turn their attention to biology and 
attempt to understand what is unique about life. After Delbrück’s first work on biology, 
Erwin Schrödinger gave his famous lectures What is Life? and Mind and Matter.23 Other 
quantum physicists who have turned to biology and grappled with the question What 
is life? include John von Neumann, Wolfgang Pauli, Nicolas Rashevsky, David Bohm, 
Walter Elsasser,24 and Howard Pattee.25 
Not all theoretical biologists began as physicists, but in biology theoreticians have 
had to struggle to be heard. While research is biology is theoretically informed, apart 
from those opposing orthodox assumptions, usually theory is presupposed rather than 
being consciously recognized as theory. Orthodox biology is dominated by the synthetic 
theory of evolution according to which existing forms of life are the outcome of replica-
tion, variations in this replication, and selection of some variants over others, and bio-
chemical or ‘molecular biological’ explanations of replication, generation of form, me-
tabolism, defence, repair and movement. Selection is either taken for granted or seen as 
the outcome of a competitive struggle for survival and the conditions for reproduction. 
That is, biology has been dominated by ontological reductionism that is more commit-
ted to explaining away life as an effect of physical processes rather than grappling with 
the question ‘What is life?’ There was opposition to this reductionism, but prior to the 
twentieth century theorising on this issue was far less rigorous than theorising in phys-
ics.26 Apart from dialectical materialists, almost all opponents of reductionism were vi-
talists, simply positing a vital force rather than making this force intelligible. It was the 
huge advances in physics that inspired biologists to challenge these reductionist assump-
tions and to attempt to develop biology on philosophical foundations which would do 
justice to life’s uniqueness, and thereby give a place to mind in nature. 
In Britain, the theoretical biology movement which began in the early nineteen thir-
ties was also inspired by developments in physics, along with the philosophy of Alfred 
North Whitehead and D’Arcy Thompson’s work on the development of biological form.27 
The main interest of this movement was in epigenesis, the differentiation of cells and 
the generation of form. Both C.H. Waddington and Joseph Needham, leading figures 
in this movement, wrote books attempting to characterize life,28 and this was a major 
     23. Erwin Schrödinger, What is Life? [1944] and Mind and Matter [1958], Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967. 
     24. See Walter M. Elsasser, Reflections on a Theory of  Organisms: Holism in Biology, Baltimore: John Hopkins, 
1987 and 1998. 
     25. See Howard Pattee, ‘Physical Basis and Origin of Hierarchical Control’, Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge 
of  Complex Systems, ed. Howard H. Pattee, New York: George Braziller, 1973, pp.73-108.
     26. Kalevi Kull traces theoretical biology back to Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876). See his introduction 
to Lectures in Theoretical Biology, Kalevi Kull and Toomas Tiivel (eds.), Tallinn: Valgus, 1988. These lectures 
describe the evolution of theoretical biology in Estonia, Russia and Germany as well as Britain.
     27. See Pnina G. Abir-Am, ‘The Biotheoretical Gathering, Trans-Disciplinary Authority and the Incipi-
ent Legitimation of Molecular Biology in the 1930s’, History of  Science, XXV, (1987), pp.1-70.
     28. Joseph Needham, Order and Life [1938] Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968 and C.H. Waddington, 
The Nature of  Life, New York: Atheneum, 1962.
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theme in the four Serbelloni conferences organized by Waddington and published as 
four influential volumes Towards a Theoretical Biology, which Waddington edited.29 While 
the research programme of these theoretical biologists was initially formulated as ‘math-
ematico-physico-chemical morphology’ their successors, the most prominent of whom 
has been Brian Goodwin, now promote their research as ‘process structuralism’.30 Stuart 
Kauffman is closely aligned with this tradition while having become one of the major 
figures in the development of complexity theory. The most radical biologist associated 
with the process structuralists, Mae-Wan Ho, has made another attempt to characterize 
the nature of life in her book The Rainbow and the Worm developing ideas from the phys-
ics of David Bohm and the philosophy of Whitehead.31 
A parallel tradition of theoretical biology originated in the work of the Austrian 
American philosopher and biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy who, beginning in the 
1920s, began to develop his general systems theory. This has been the focus of opposi-
tion to reductionist biology in USA.32 Further developments of systems theory by Her-
bert Simon and others, along with the non-linear thermodynamics of Ilya Prigogine 
and synergetics (the science of structure) of Hermann Haken have been points of depar-
ture for the development of complexity theory and further developments in theoretical 
biology.33 The Santa Fe Institute, founded to examine complexity in general and com-
plex adaptive systems in particular, has integrated all this work.34 A different approach 
to complexity has been developed by hierarchy theorists, also influenced by Simon. The 
foremost hierarchy theorists, Howard Pattee, T.F.H. Allen and Stanley Salthe have de-
veloped a more radically anti-reductionist framework of ideas than the members of the 
Santa Fe Institute, based on their analyses of the partial autonomy and downward cau-
sation associated with emergent constraints of systems characterized by different proc-
ess rates. This has aligned them with European complexity theorists.35 
     29. C.H. Waddington (ed.), Towards a Theoretical Biology, (4 volumes), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1968-72. 
     30. See Brian Goodwin and Peter Saunders (eds). Theoretical Biology: Epigenetic and Evolutionary Order from 
Complex Systems, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989. For a recent statement of Goodwin’s views, 
see Ricard Solé and Brian Goodwin, Signs of  Life: How Complexity Pervades Biology, New York: Basic Books, 
2000.
     31. The Rainbow and the Worm: The Physics of  Organisms, Singapore: World Scientific, 1993.
     32. See Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Application, rev. ed., New 
York: George Braziller, 1968.
     33. See Howard H. Pattee (ed.), Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of  Complex Sysems, New York: George 
Brazillier, 1973. For a short account of synergetics, see Hermann Haken, The Science of  Structure: Synergetics, 
trans. Fred Bradley, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1984 for a short statement of Haken’s research 
program.
     34. An enormous amount of work in theoretical biology has come out recently under the banner of com-
plexity theory, much of it published by the Santa Fe Institute. For an overview of the program of the Santa 
Fe Institute, see George A. Cowan, David Pines and David Meltzer (eds), Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and 
Reality, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1994. 
     35. Apart from works by Pattee, see Stanley N. Salthe, Evolving Hierarchical Systems, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985) and Valerie Ahl & T.F.H. Allen, Hierarchy Theory, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996. On European complexity theory, see Peter Bøgh Andersen et.al. (eds), Downward Causation, 
Langelandsgade: Aarhus University Press, 2000; and Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts and Bruce Ed-
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Robert Rosen, who made one of the most thorough efforts so far to expose the fail-
ings of reductionism in biology and to promote the development of complexity theory 
also aligned himself with von Bertalanffy.36 However, Rosen was more influenced by 
Nicholas Rashevsky, a physicist turned mathematical biologist who pioneered among 
other things the development of neural nets. In 1954, after having pioneered neural nets, 
Rashevsky came to the conclusion that his previous work in biology was fundamentally 
limited, that explanations of the workings of different aspects of organisms cannot be 
pasted together to account for the organism as a whole, and that what is needed is, as 
Rosen put it, ‘a principle that governs the way in which physical phenomena are organ-
ized, a principle that governs the organization of phenomena, rather than the phenome-
na themselves.’37 Taking this insight as a point of departure, Rosen wrote of the machine 
metaphor and the reductionism associated with it: ‘I hope to convince the reader, in the 
course of the present work, that the machine metaphor is not just a little wrong; it is en-
tirely wrong and must be discarded.’38 
Overwhelmingly, theoretical biologists are anti-reductionists. In one way or anoth-
er they all argue that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and that it is neces-
sary to overcome the assumptions of traditional science to make sense of life. However, 
such work is marginal to mainstream biology which has been far more influenced by 
the reductionism of the molecular biologists and socio-biologists (Francis Crick, James 
Watson, Jacques Monod, W.D. Hamilton and Richard Dawkins) and those who have 
modelled cognition on artificial intelligence.  As Rosen noted: ‘The question “What is 
life?” is not often asked in biology, precisely because the machine metaphor already an-
swers it: “Life is a machine.” Indeed, to suggest otherwise is regarded as unscientific and 
viewed with the greatest hostility as an attempt to take biology back to metaphysics.’39 
There are two questions raised by the continued dominance of the machine meta-
phor. The first is: What is this metaphor? The second is: What should replace it? While 
there is not yet a final consensus by theoretical biologists on how the second question 
should be answered, Rosen’s work is particularly important for clarifying the first ques-
tion, and thereby showing what assumptions have to be overcome. 
ROBERT ROSEN: AGAINST REDUCTIONISM
There are two aspects to Rosen’s characterization of the machine metaphor. To begin 
with, Rosen noted that it presupposes that a system is intrinsically simple or can be 
analysed into simple components. Such a system is typically defined in terms of a fixed 
number of degrees of freedom represented as variables in the equations of motion. Once 
monts (eds), Worldviews, Science and Us: Philosophy and Complexity, New Jersey: World Scientific, 2007. 
     36. See ‘Autobiographical Reminiscences of Robert Rosen’, Axiomathes, 16 (1-2), March, 2006: 1-23. 
     37. Robert Rosen, Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of  Life, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991, p.113. See also N. Rachevsky, Topology and life in search of  general mathematical 
principles in biology and sociology’ Bulletin of  Mathematical Biology, 16 (1954): 317-348.
     38. Rosen, Life Itself, p.23.
     39. Rosen, Life Itself, p.23.
COSMOS AND HISTORY62
the initial conditions are specified for a given time, that is, the state of the system, inte-
gration of the equations of motion enables the state of the system at any other time to be 
determined. Nature can then be represented mathematically through analytic models 
which identify independently existing components which can be studied independently 
of the whole, and the whole then explained through knowledge of these components. 
This is the resolutive-compositive approach to science defended as a general method by 
Hobbes under the influence of Galileo’s physics. 
However, Rosen argued that behind this model of explanation are deeper assump-
tions which have their origins in Pythagorean mathematics. These underlie Newton’s 
mechanics, and Rosen argued that not even quantum theory has abandoned these 
more basic assumptions. It is these assumptions that Rosen was concerned to reveal, 
question, and replace. As he put it:
It is my contention that mathematics took a disastrous wrong turn some time in 
the sixth century B.C. This wrong turn can be expressed as an ongoing attempt, 
since then, to identify effectiveness with computability. … From that original 
mistake, and the attempts to maintain it, have grown a succession of foundation 
crises in mathematics. … The impact of that wrong turn, made so long ago, has 
spread far beyond mathematics. It has entangled itself into our most basic notions 
of what science is. It might seem a far cry from the ultimately empirical concerns 
of contemporary science to the remote inner world of mathematics, but at root 
it is not; they both, in their different ways, rest on processes of measuring things, 
and on searching for relations (“laws”) between what they measure. From this 
common concern with measurement, concepts pertaining to mathematics have 
seeped into epistemology, becoming so basic a part of the adjective scientific that 
most people are quite unaware they are even there.40
Pythagoras’ wrong turn involved, firstly taking mathematical truth ‘as the best truth 
– independent of the mathematician, independent of the external world, unchange-
able even by God himself, beyond the scope of miracle in a way that the material 
world never was.’41 Secondly, Pythagoras attempted to account for geometrical qualities 
through a simple recursive procedure of counting (what, Rosen argued, he really meant 
by claiming that ‘all things are numbers’, and in which he failed because of with irra-
tional numbers), then to account for the quality of musical harmonies in the same way. 
This provided a springboard to account for the entire cosmos. The quest for objectivity 
in mathematics and science by only allowing a simple recursive procedure runs through 
the whole history of their development. It found expression in Hobbes’ claim that all 
reasoning is merely adding and subtracting.42 In mathematics, the full implications of 
this quest was clarified when it led to Hilbert’s formalist programme of dispensing with 
referents in mathematics and characterizing it as the manipulation of symbols according 
to formal rules, and to the Church-Turing thesis, that every physically realizable process 
     40. Robert Rosen, ‘The Church-Pythagoras Thesis’ in Essays on Life Itself, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999, Ch.4, p.63. 
     41. Rosen, ‘The Church-Pythagoras Thesis’, p.64.
     42. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, Ch.5.
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is computable by a Turing machine, an extremely simply device for processing symbols 
according to a mechanical algorithm which involves moving from one state to another. 
Effectively, what Hilbert was arguing is that semantics could be completely replaced by 
formally describable syntactical operations that reduce to instructions on how to pro-
ceed from one symbol to another, and Church and Turing conjectured that all such op-
erations could be performed by a simple, recursively functioning machine. Rosen noted 
the implications of accepting this: ‘Once inside such a universe … we cannot get out 
again, because all the original external referents have presumably been pulled inside with 
us. The thesis in effect assures us that we never need to get outside again, that all referents 
have indeed been internalised in a purely syntactical form.’43
Rosen’s argument is these strictures on what is to count as objective and scientific 
knowledge were embraced by Newton. This is essentially what Newtonian mechanics 
amounts to, and this is what underlies and defines almost all subsequent science. As he 
put it: 
[T]he central concept of Newtonian mechanics, from which all others flow 
as corollaries or collaterals, is the concept of state, and with it, the effective 
introduction of recursion as the basic underpinning of science itself. … Thus, in 
my view, the Principia ultimately mandated thereby the most profound changes in 
the concept of Natural Law itself; in some ways a sharpening but in deeper ways, 
by imposing the most severe restrictions and limitations upon it.44 
Newton did not analyse the world into atoms, as had the ancient atomists, but simply 
took over their conclusions and presupposed atomism. He began with structureless par-
ticles and then devoted his work entirely to synthesis, asking what behaviour can be 
manifested by such particles, individually or collectively. This procedure has remained 
unchanged in modern physics. A feature of the formalism he developed is that almost 
everything of importance in it is unentailed. The only entailment is a recursive rule 
governing state succession. In the world seen through this kind of model, causation 
is collapsed down to what can be encoded in a state transition sequence, as this is all 
the Newtonian language allows to be decoded back into causal language. There are 
further strictures in this procedure associated with the assumption that the universe is 
composed of structureless particles. Every system has a largest model from which every 
other model can be effectively abstracted by purely formal means, and ‘this largest 
model is of an essentially syntactic nature, in that structureless, unanalyzable elements 
(the particles) are pushed around by mandated rules of entailment that are themselves 
beyond the reach of entailment.’45 On the basis of this analysis of Newtonian science, 
Rosen defined a natural system as mechanical if it possesses the following properties:‘(1) 
it has a largest model, consisting of a set of states, and a recursion rule entailing subse-
quent state from present state; and (2) every other state of it can be obtained from the 
largest one by formal means.’ Natural law, as it came to be redefined on the basis of 
     43. Rosen, ‘The Church-Pythagoras Thesis’, p.77.
     44. Rosen, Life Itself, p.89f.
     45. Rosen, Life Itself, p.103.
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these assumptions by Newton and as it is still understood ‘boils down to the assertion 
that every natural system is a mechanism.’46
Rosen argued that this whole approach to achieving objective knowledge was un-
dermined when Gödel refuted Hilbert’s formalist account of mathematics and showed 
that Number Theory is not a closable, finite system of inferential entailment. It cannot 
be freed of all referents and remain mathematics. More generally, whatever is modelled 
by a formal system in which all entailment is syntactic entailment, is different from, 
richer and more complex than its formal model. It is impossible to reduce quality to 
quantity, or equivalently, semantics to syntax. Rosen then pointed out the implications 
of this for science. Having identified the deep assumptions of modern science, Rosen 
argued that not only is its mathematical ‘rigor’ and commitment to ‘objectivity’ and 
‘context independence’ illusory, but because of its assumptions none of the present sci-
entific formalisms are adequate to reality.47 Science based on these assumptions has pro-
duced not only a too limited universe of discourse to characterize life, but a surrogate 
universe of discourse inadequate to understand the material world.48 Far more can be 
learned about the material world through a careful study of biology than can ever be 
learned from physics, he argued. 
To open the path to a more adequate biology, Rosen examined entailment, model-
ling and measurement. While entailment between propositions is relatively straightfor-
ward, the more problematic question is, Can we ascribe entailment between phenom-
ena? Semantic language, Rosen noted, ‘by its very nature imputes hordes of entailments 
to the ambience, without going dramatically astray.’49 In arguing this, Rosen was sup-
porting Aristotle’s criticisms of Pythagoras for failing to give a proper place to causation, 
and he supported Aristotle’s claim that it is necessary to recognize four different forms 
of causation: material, formal, efficient and final.50 That is, it is necessary to allow far 
richer forms of entailment in nature than Newtonian physics had allowed. 
Modelling, which Rosen took to be the essence of science, is bringing entailment 
patterns between a model and that which is modelled into congruence. Rosen used 
his own version of category theory to analyse what is involved in modelling. As Rosen 
noted:
Category Theory comprises … the general theory of formal modelling, the 
comparison of different modes of inferential or entailment structures. Moreover, 
it is a stratified or hierarchical structure without limit. The lowest level, which is 
familiarly understood by Category Theory, is … a comparison of different kinds 
of entailment in different formalisms. The next level is, roughly, the comparison of 
comparisons. The next level is the comparison of these, and so on.51 
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To relate what is to be modelled to a model is a matter of encoding, while relating the 
model to what is modelled is decoding. Encoding, involving measurement, is a form 
of abstraction, an act of replacing the thing measured by a limited set of numbers, 
while decoding, is an inverse measurement, a ‘de-abstraction’ going from propositions 
to events.52 These procedures are inseparable from recognition, discrimination and clas-
sification and cannot be formalized. Encoding and decoding is an art, and this is true 
of all modelling. If modelling is successful, then what is modelled is a realization of the 
model. While normally we regard a formal system as a model of a natural system, it is 
possible to regard the natural system as a model of the formal system, and to regard 
natural systems as models of each other. This is a relationship of analogy. Rosen argued 
that the mathematical machinery currently regarded as the only way to carry out this 
process is far too narrow. What it allows us to capture about the world around us, neces-
sarily misses most of what is really going on, and most importantly, misses out on life.53
To develop science adequate to life, Rosen showed how, by rejecting assumptions 
of traditional science, it becomes possible to give a place to functions and final causes 
and to ask Why? questions as well as How? questions. Essentially, he refurbished and 
defended an Aristotelian form of science giving a place to all the four causes, including 
final cause. While in mechanisms, such causes can be examined in abstraction from 
each other, in life the four causes are so intertwined that they cannot be treated in this 
way. Rosen showed how to represent systems through synthetic models in which func-
tional components are the direct products of the system. In such models the compo-
nents are context dependent and cannot be reduced to parts without being destroyed. 
These are able to represent systems in which functional organization cuts across physi-
cal structures and physical structures are simultaneously involved in a variety of func-
tional activities. These are modelled mathematically by sets in which addition of sets 
does not equate to the addition of the members of sets. That is, in place of a science that 
focuses on identifying independent material parts and showing how they operate, but 
which then obliterates any appreciation of the organization of the whole, Rosen devel-
oped a science of organization in which organization could be treated independently of 
its material instantiation. It focussed on ‘life itself ’ rather than the mechanisms utilized 
by life. 
While Rosen characterized his work as a contribution to complexity theory, it is im-
portant to appreciate that Rosen’s notion of complexity was far more radical than that 
of most people who have embraced this term. For Rosen the use of genetic algorithms, 
Boolean networks, cellular automata, artificial neural networks and related approach-
es are merely implementations of the Newtonian paradigm made possible by modern 
computers. This for Rosen is merely complication, not complexity. Rosen defined a 
complex system as a system that requires multiple formal descriptions, which are not 
derivable from each other, to adequately capture all its properties. That is, there is no 
ultimate model of a complex system from which the other models, which can be for-
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mally identified and abstracted from the system, can be deduced. Rosen had developed 
a ‘metabolism-repair’ model of life which illustrates this.54 This model consists of three 
algebraic maps, one of which represents the efficient cause of metabolism in a cell, an-
other, the efficient cause of repair (the process that repairs damage to the metabolic 
process from environmental insult), and the third representing replication which repairs 
damage to the repair process. Stephen Kercel explicated this: 
These three maps in the (M,R)-system each have a peculiar property. Each map 
has one of the other two as a member of its co-domain, and is itself a member of 
the co-domain of the remaining map. Thus, the metabolism map is a member 
of the co-domain of the repair map, and the repair map is a member of the co-
domain of the replication map… As can be seen, the three maps form a loop, 
but not just any loop. Note that the map does not merely entail the result; more 
resticively, it contains it. The maps form a loop of mutual containment.55 
In this way a system is modelled which is ‘closed to efficient causation’, that is, which 
generates its own components and is an immanent cause of itself so that an explanation 
of the component can only be answered in terms of the system. Or, as Rosen put it: ‘a 
material system is an organism if, and only if, it is closed to efficient causation. That 
is, if ƒ is any component of such a system, the question “why ƒ” has an answer within 
the system, which corresponds to the category of efficient cause of ƒ.” 56 On the basis of 
such models it is possible to appreciate the ability of complex systems to incorporate a 
model of their environment into their behaviour, anticipating future events and correct-
ing their behaviour as new information sheds light on the anticipatory process.57 Such 
models cannot be simulated by a computer. 
While Rosen’s ideas are only beginning to have an impact on theoretical biology, 
his work supports most efforts in this field to overcome reductionism and do justice to 
life. In particular, he has pointed out the relevance of his work for the study of protein 
folding and morphogenesis, which have always been deeply troubling to physicists.58 As 
Kepler and Newton freed science from the assumption of earlier astronomers that all 
planetary motion is in circles, Rosen has freed science, and biology in particular, from 
assumptions about mathematical modelling which effectively made life itself unintel-
ligible. Just as Kepler and Newton enabled us to see that circular motion is only one 
kind of regular motion approximated in rare cases, we can now see that the kind of 
order revealed by scientists working within the constraints of Newtonian assumptions 
is a very limited range of possible order approximated in rare cases, for instance in the 
solar system or in experimental situations where conditions are carefully controlled. 
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And as we no longer assume circular motion and motion as deviations from this, we no 
longer need to treat closed systems consisting of independent parts as a reference point 
for scientific explanation. As Rosen noted, ‘in physics, the closed system is still taken as 
primary, and opening the system is regarded as some kind of perturbation.’59 But, as he 
pointed out, a closed system is, in dynamical terms, so extremely non-generic that there 
is not much which can be said in general along this line. It is much more reasonable to 
regard the closed system as an extremely degenerate case of open systems. For provid-
ing the basis for such a radical reorientation of science Rosen has been called with some 
justification by one of his expositors, Donald Mikulecky, ‘biology’s Newton’.60 
However, Rosen was doing more than this. He aligned himself with and contributed 
to the development of ‘endophysics’, the view that scientists must see themselves as part 
of the world they are striving to understand.61 At the same time Rosen appreciated that 
this world is autonomous, characterized by immanent causation by which life has been 
fabricated.62 And as Mikulecky noted, he was also rejecting the assumption of main-
stream science that there is ‘an “objective” real world outside ourselves that we have 
access to without any ‘contamination’ from our mental processes.’63 We can achieve ob-
jective knowledge, but this cannot be counterposed to the subjective, but must include 
the subjective.64 Rosen noted in concluding Life Itself   that:
As Einstein kept insisting, science involves a free creative act of their intellect; 
ultimately, it involves wisdom. It involves the ability to select what is important 
about a problem from what is irrelevant or incidental, and to follow that. There is 
no algorithm for this, just as there is no algorithm for making a model.65
By showing the impossibility of reducing semantics to syntax, Rosen allowed a place 
not only to life itself but to the creative acts of the intellect and to the wisdom of great 
thinkers. 
Granting a place to creative acts and wisdom does not equate to making these intel-
ligible, however. And while Rosen has made a convincing case that life itself cannot be 
understood by pasting together our understanding of the components of life, he has not 
shown how life itself could have come to be. Theoretical biology still needs philosophi-
cal biology, and the problem is: How can the insights of the philosophical biologists be 
integrated with theoretical biology?
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UNITING PHILOSOPHICAL BIOLOGY AND THEORETICAL BIOLOGY: 
SCHELLING AND THE TRADITION OF PROCESS PHILOSOPHY
The way I have proceeded so far is to have presented philosophical biology as taking its 
starting point in the experiencing subject and striving to overcome the idealist tenden-
cies of this by showing how organisms can be seen as experiencing meaning, and then to 
have presented theoretical biology as taking its starting point in the objective world and 
striving to overcome the reductionist tendencies of this by showing how it is possible to 
give a place to life in an objective world. Both the meaning of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
have been brought into question and transformed in this process. But despite moving 
towards the same end point, overcoming Cartesian dualism and reviving Aristotelian 
themes that had been dismissed with the rise of the mechanistic world view, there is 
still a gap between these two approaches. Recognizing this gap should indicate what 
needs to be done. It is necessary to recognize a realm more primordial than the division 
between the subjective and the objective from which these could have emerged. This, 
essentially, is the path proposed by Friedrich Schelling (1775-1855) although this has 
seldom been appreciated, as he continues to be classified as an Idealist. In pioneering 
this path, Schelling, reviving and advancing the evolutionary cosmology of Giordano 
Bruno and developing the philosophy of nature of Johann Herder and Goethe, began 
the modern tradition of process philosophy. 
Schelling began as an Idealist as a disciple of Fichte. Kant had argued that the free, 
unified self-conscious transcendental ego (the unified ‘I think’ which accompanies all 
perceptions) is a condition for posing questions to nature and performing experiments 
accordingly, thereby achieving knowledge of the world. Fichte argued that only through 
mutual recognition between people, whose thought emerges first in relation to action in 
a world which resists their will, could such self-consciousness be achieved. Schelling ac-
cepted this argument but (following Hölderlin) concluded that it had to be taken further. 
It is also necessary to conceive the ego as part of and within an independently existing 
nature to make intelligible the possibility of self-consciousness. To show that conscious-
ness as conceived by Fichte could have emerged within nature it was necessary to reject 
not only the mechanistic world-view but also Kant’s solution to the incompatibility of 
the mechanical view of the world and the assumption of free agency, holding that the 
mechanical world is mere appearance, the outcome of the organization of the sensory 
manifold by the productive imagination, the forms of intuition (space and time) and the 
categories of the understanding. Instead, Schelling argued that our comprehension of 
human consciousness has to be based on the philosophy of nature, replacing the mecha-
nistic conception of the physical world with a conception of nature as dynamic and crea-
tive within which humans as social, self-conscious, creative beings, could have evolved. 
To account for the emergence of subjects living in a world of objects Schelling argued 
that it is necessary to reject both the approach to nature which begins with the subject 
and then appends objective reality to it, and the approach which begins with the objec-
tive world and then appends subjective experience to it. It is necessary to identify a more 
primordial realm from which subjects and objects could emerge. His procedure was to 
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subtract from self-consciousness to arrive at the lowest conceivable potential, and then 
construct the path upward through a successions of limits to show how the conscious self 
could emerge from this as its highest potential. The lowest potential arrived at was the 
‘pure subject-object’, which Schelling equated with nature, and, he claimed, the ‘uncon-
scious’ stages through which consciousness emerges can only become conscious to an ‘I’ 
which has developed out of them and realizes its dependence upon them. On this basis 
Schelling conceived nature to be essentially self-constraining or limiting activity, simul-
taneously ‘productivity’ (or process) and ‘products’. Insofar as nature is productivity, it is 
subject; insofar as it is product, it is object. 
As Schelling conceived it, productivity consists in opposed activities limiting each 
other. He proclaimed, ‘give me a nature made up of opposed activities … and from that 
I will bring forth for you the intelligence, with the whole system of its presentations.’66 
From opposed activities emerge force and matter, space and time, chemicals and non-
living and living organisms. Whatever product or form exists is in perpetual process 
of forming itself. According to Schelling, the process of self-constitution or self-organ-
ization, rather than being a marginal phenomenon, must be the primal ground of all 
reality. Causal ‘community’ in which a whole maintains itself by reciprocal causation, 
instead of being treated as a derivative form of causation, as in Kant, was taken as the 
primary form of causation, with the cause-effect relations of mechanistic thought taken 
as derivative. Dead matter, in which product prevails over productivity, is a result of the 
stable balance of forces where products have achieved a state of indifference. Schell-
ing characterized living beings as inherently unbalanced and thereby of necessity ac-
tively engaged with their environments. ‘[L]ife must be thought of as engaged in a con-
stant struggle against the course of nature, or in an endeavour to uphold its identity 
against the latter’ Schelling wrote.67 Living beings must respond to changes in their en-
vironments creatively to form and reform themselves as products. Schelling argued that 
higher developments of life are associated with greater imbalances, requiring of organ-
isms greater awareness of the world around them, more active responses to this world 
and greater levels of creativity. The senses are an essential component of such creative 
activity. From senses that gave organisms an awareness of their immediate environ-
ment, organisms have evolved other senses enabling them to perceive at successively 
greater distances. This conception of living organisms provides the basis for defining the 
specific characteristics of humans. With humans we have much more complex forms of 
semiosis facilitating greater levels of intersubjectivity and reflexivity, the transcendence 
of egocentic perspectives and the appearance of the world as objective, shared by other 
subjects (the mitwelt). That is, with humanity we have the emergence of culture, and with 
culture, the development of philosophy, mathematics and science.
While it is generally appreciated that Schelling had a significant influence on the 
development of hermeneutics and on Heidegger in particular, Schelling’s problematic 
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and evolutionary cosmology also inspired directly or indirectly the work of C.S. Peirce, 
Henri Bergson, Aleksandr Bogdanov, Alfred North Whitehead and Ludwig von Berta-
lanffy, each of whom has had an influence on the development of philosophical biology 
or theoretical biology, or both of these.68 While philosophical biology and theoretical 
biology emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century, against the background 
of the influence of Schelling it is now possible to see them as divergent developments 
of the anti-mechanistic naturalism of Schelling. It is also possible to see the basis of this 
divergence. It is easier to develop a conception of the subject that simultaneously gave 
a place to the objective realm, firstly, by construing the subject as embodied, and sec-
ondly, as seeing the objective realm as part of the world of the subject defined in rela-
tion to it, than it is to develop a conception of the objective that simultaneously gives a 
place to the subject. This can only be done by qualifying the notion of objective without 
denying its ontological status. Firstly, to account for emergence, and most importantly 
emergence involving semiosis and awareness, it is necessary to appreciate that this in-
volves immanent causation at different levels, and that this causation involves limiting 
or constraining. Secondly, and more fundamentally, as Schelling concluded and came 
to appreciate more as he got older, and as virtually all process philosophers have argued, 
it is necessary to appreciate that such immanent causation involves creative becoming 
and that this underlies all else, and this cannot be entirely objectified.  
ROSEN, BIOSEMIOTICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL BIOLOGY
Since in discussing theoretical biology I have focused on the work of Rosen, it is mainly 
in relation to his work that I will attempt to clarify what process philosophy implies 
for theoretical biology, and how this could realign it with philosophical biology and its 
developments, particularly developments associated with biosemiotics and bioherme-
neutics. To begin with, it should be noted that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie has had a tre-
mendous influence on science.69 Oersted’s work on chemistry and electro-magnetism 
was strongly influenced by Schelling.70 The principle of ‘conservation of energy’ was 
formulated by scientists who had been influenced by Schelling.71 Schelling had a sig-
nificant influence on the work of Hermann Grassmann, the brilliant nineteenth century 
German mathematician (who strongly influenced Alfred North Whitehead).72 And it 
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has been argued that Schelling is the precursor of systems theory.73 So it is not as though 
Schelling’s philosophy can be regarded as merely a complement to science. Modern sci-
ence, to the extent that it has transcended Newtonian physics, is largely built on ideas 
deriving from or developed by Schelling. To a considerable extent Rosen was building 
on developments in science deriving from Schelling’s work. Furthermore, where Rosen 
was not building on this work his ideas converged with Schelling’s philosophy. While de-
fending Aristotle’s notion of causation, Rosen also alluded to and defended ‘immanent 
causation’, which is essentially Schelling’s notion of ‘community of causation.’ Although 
Rosen did not elaborate on what he meant by immanent causation and instead used 
Aristotelian notions of causation, he modified Aristotle’s notions by deploying the notion 
of ‘constraint’. As Stephen Kercel pointed out:
It must be appreciated that Rosen’s notion of efficient cause is slightly different 
from Aristotle’s. … In Rosen’s parlance, the constraint characterizing a map is 
an inferential entailment. By congruency of entailment, the corresponding cause 
entailment, the constraint that entails a specific material effect as the result 
of a given material cause, is what distinguishes efficient cause. … The map is 
characterized by the constraint it imposes on transformations. The corresponding 
efficient cause is the ontological constraint on the transformation of material cause 
into material effect.74 
Although it has entirely different origins,75 this notion of constraint accords with Schell-
ing’s notion of ‘limit’. Finally, Rosen embraced the notion of emergence,76 which as I 
have argued elsewhere, also has its roots in Schelling’s philosophy of nature.77
Early in his career, Rosen was centrally concerned with how living organisms de-
velop heritable internal models that direct metabolism and reproduction, behaviour 
patterns and new functions. Working closely with Howard Pattee, they each came to 
the conclusion that these could be modeled by physical laws, provided they are aug-
mented by local boundary conditions that constrain the dynamics of the system defined 
by them. At this stage both Rosen and Pattee were concerned with the dual issue of how 
organisms could control physical processes through internal models and how scientists 
could understand life through models. Both came to believe that non-integrable or non-
holonomic constraints (first studied by Heinrich Herz) could model informational and 
biological systems. Pattee utilized the notion of non-holonomic constraints to account 
for the emergence of symbols through which control is achieved over lower level com-
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ponents of a system and generalized this notion of constraint to account for hierarchical 
order in general. On the basis of his and further work on hierachical order, particularly 
work that has examined hierarchical order based on different spatio-temporal scales, 
it is now appreciated that constraints and constraining can be facilitative and creative, 
that, as Alicia Juarrero put it: ‘constraints not only reduce the alternatives – they also 
create alternatives. Constraints … can also create properties which a component exhib-
its in virtue of its embeddedness in a system, properties it would not otherwise have.’78 
Hierarchy theory has been embraced and developed by a number of other theoretical 
biologists (notably, Salthe) and ecologists and has provided the means to account for 
emergence and a bridge between theoretical physics, theoretical biology and biosemi-
otics.79 As with Schelling’s notion of limit, the notion of constraint is seen as a way of 
explaining life and mind without postulating additional vital forces and thinking sub-
stances able to control matter or explaining away life and mind. 
Rosen abandoned his early study of the microphysical basis for the specificity of 
organisms, that is, genetic information, when he came to realize that it is impossible to 
divide an active information site in an organism from everything else.80 Pattee wrote a 
long critical review of Rosen’s later work, tracing the development of his more critical 
attitude to mainstream science.81 He suggested that Rosen’s greater interest in formalism 
led him in a more idealist direction, which led him to ignore the physical basis of life. 
Given the place Rosen granted to causation, however, this characterization is question-
able. What does seem to have occurred is that Rosen came to the conclusion that it was 
a mistake to make biology subservient to physics. As he argued in a Festschrift for David 
Bohm: ‘In every confrontation between universal physics and special biology, it is phys-
ics which has always had to give ground.’82 While lauding von Bertalanffy’s observation 
that open systems exhibited many parallels with morphogenetic phenomena in biology 
and the great advances by Rashevsky, Turing and Ilya Prigogine following from this ob-
servation (dissipative structures, stability theory, catastrophe theory, bifurcation theory 
etc.), he noted that the physical basis of these phenomena is in an extremely unsatisfac-
tory state. He concluded that open systems should be taken as paradigmatic in science 
rather than being treated as problematic perturbations of closed systems, and on this 
basis developed his new approach to identifying components which did not start with 
the components that could be identified as context free, fractionable physical elements. 
     78. Juarrero, ‘Causality as Constraint’, p.234. 
     79. See H.H. Pattee, ‘The Necessity of Biosemiotics: Matter-Symbol Complementarity’, In Burbieiri (ed.) 
Introduction to Biosemiotics, Ch.4. For further development of these ideas, integrating hierarchy theory with 
non-linear thermodynamics, other developments of complexity theory and Peircian biosemiotics, see Stan-
ley N. Salthe, Development and Evolution: Complexity and Change in Biology ,Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993. 
See also J.L. Lemke, ‘Material Sign Processes and Emergent Ecosocial Organizations’, in Anderson, Down-
ward Causation, pp.181-213.
     80. Rosen, ‘Some epistemological issues in physics and biology’, p.316f.
     81. Howard H. Pattee, ‘Laws, Constraints, and the Modeling Relation – History and Interpretations’, 
Chemistry and Biodiversity, 4 (2007): 2272-2295.
     82. Robert Rosen, ‘Some epistemological issues in physics and biology,’ Quantum Implications: Essays in 
Honour of  David Bohm, B.J. Hiley and F.David Peat (eds),  London: Routledge, 1987, p.315.
ARRAN GARE 73
It would seem that in this regard, Rosen abandoned Pattee’s and the hierarchy theorists’ 
approach to accounting for emergence as simple a matter of the interpolation of a new 
level of constraining of previously existing entities and thereby deviated from Schell-
ing’s natural philosophy. Rosen’s relational model of life is not equivalent to a constraint 
controlled dynamic model. The relationship between emergent levels of organization, 
which Rosen claimed do exist, and the kinds of entities that are studied by physicists and 
chemists, must be seen as far less simple than hierarchy theorists have supposed. How-
ever, there is no reason why Rosen’s work should be taken as implying that there are 
no constraints operating on fractional components at all, or that the work of hierarchy 
theorists on the relationship between levels of organization characterized by greatly dif-
ferent process rates and temporal and spatial scales is invalid. Conversely, Pattee has ac-
knowledged the possible contribution that the relational model could make to science.83 
What is really brought into question by Rosen’s later work is the assumption that simple 
physical systems can be properly understood in abstraction from their contexts, while 
the case that wholes cannot be understood by adding together knowledge of simpler 
systems is strengthened. In questioning these assumptions Rosen was allying himself 
with physicists such as David Bohm. However, Rosen made no effort to accommodate 
the ideas of the hierarchy theorists, and in fact appeared to lack any appreciation of the 
relative autonomy of different temporal levels of organization in complex systems.84  
There is another problematic aspect of Rosen’s account of life. Both Pattee and 
Rosen characterized science as modeling systems, with Rosen equating success with es-
tablishing a congruence between the model and that which is modeled. Both character-
ized life as having internal models of the world. That is, they appear to have accepted 
a representational view of knowledge and perception, a view which emerged with the 
mechanistic world-view. Construing knowledge and science as modeling the world is 
usually developed in opposition to approaches to knowledge and perception that em-
phasize the development of schema through which the world is interpreted. The latter 
approach, deriving from Kant, avoids the problem of establishing a dualism between 
the model and the modeled.85 On this issue, Schelling was aligned with Kant, as was 
Delbrück who followed the genetic epistemologist, Jean Piaget, in this regard. 
The potentially problematic aspects of the notion of modeling can be avoided to 
some extent by conceiving of modeling through Peircian semiotics. Peirce, in develop-
ing his theory of semiosis, began as a Kantian and later claimed to be a Schellingian of 
some stripe, and was particularly concerned to avoid the dead-ends that resulted from 
dualistic thinking.86 For Peirce, a model is an iconic sign, and as such involves a dyadic 
relation. However, Peirce always understood the production and interpretation of signs 
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as a triadic relation. Models are produced and interpreted as signs, requiring the tri-
adic relation between the sign produced, the object signified, and the interpretation of 
the sign. Further, examining the iconic relation between models and what is modeled 
is to have gone beyond this dyadic relation to a triadic relation of the object (or system) 
modeled, the model, and the interpretation of the relationship between these. Interpret-
ing modeling in accordance with Peirce allows us to appreciate Rosen’s careful stud-
ies of modeling while providing a better understanding of the semantic aspects of this. 
Rosen interpreted the modeling relation through category theory, noting that not only 
can there be no algorithm for encoding and decoding models, but that category theory 
cannot be formalized and for this reason is sometimes not seen as part of mathematics.87 
However, it can be easily accommodated within Peircian philosophy, as this reflection 
on mathematical structures can itself be appreciated as a triadic relation. 
When Rosen’s work is interpreted through Peircian semiotics, it can be related more 
easily to biosemiotics, and from there to the core ideas of the philosophical biologists. 
Biosemioticians, most importantly Thomas Sebeok, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Kalevi Kull and 
Alexai Sharov have interpreted the work of Uexküll as a semiotician, interpreting his 
work through Peircian semiotics. As Sharov argued:
The main idea of Uexküll is that each component of Umwelt has a functional 
meaning for an organism; it may be food, shelter, enemy, or simply an object that 
is used in orientation. An organism actively creates its Umwelt through repeated 
interaction with the world. … The Umwelt-theory also implies that it is not 
possible to separate mind from the world (matter) because mind makes the world 
meaningful. The theory of meaning developed by Uexküll is consistent with the 
ideas of semiotics (theory of signs) proposed earlier by Charles Sanders Peirce. 
… Translating the theory of Uexküll into the language of semiotics, we can say 
that Umwelt is not a set of objects in the environment but rather a system of signs 
interpreted by an organism.88
That is, interpreted through Peircian semiotics, organisms can be understood as beings 
in a meaningful world in a way that is irreducible to physics. 
However, for Peircian semiotics to make sense there are other dimensions which 
have to be brought into theoretical biology. These are, firstly, the temporality of exist-
ence, and secondly, a better appreciation of hierarchical ordering associated with such 
temporality. To fully understand the capacity of organisms to define their environments 
as worlds with enduring potentialities that they can respond to on the basis of antici-
pated effects of their responses, it is necessary to appreciate, along with the complex 
interdependencies focussed on by Rosen, the durational nature of becoming and the 
hierarchical ordering of this becoming.89 
Temporality is central to what it is to be a subject. Kant appreciated this and had 
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characterized time as the inner form of sense. In the final phase of his philosophical 
career Schelling argued that time is central to the unprethinkable being which precedes 
all reflection, logic and mathematics. Following Schelling, process philosophers all take 
time as becoming as irreducibly basic to existence. This is evident in Peirce for whom 
semiosis is essentially temporal. However, appreciation of temporality is even more cen-
tral to the philosophy of Bergson and Whitehead. Bergson argued that time as duration 
is different than the spatialized time as measured by physicists. As durational it cannot 
be conceived as a point moving along a line but involves memory and anticipation. 
Whitehead largely concurred with Bergson on this issue and emphasised that nature is 
creative advance. Such work provides support for the place accorded to and the treat-
ment of temporality in phenomenology and hermeneutics, particularly in the work of 
Heidegger, who in characterizing human existence as being-in-the-world, emphasised 
its temporal nature and also characterized human existence as being-towards-death. 
Philosophical biologists embraced this emphasis on temporality and mortality of exist-
ence, taking it as central to life that it is always threatened with death. Plessner’s notion 
of ‘positionality’ of living beings presupposes and implies that organisms are in process 
of becoming revealing and responding to the possibilities of their environments. This is 
also the case with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of vital structures where ‘equilibrium is ob-
tained, not with respect to real and present conditions, but with respect to conditions 
which are only virtual and which the system itself bring into existence…’90 Jonas, follow-
ing Heidegger, argued that emotion in animals is a manifestation of their appreciation 
of their mortality. 
All this is inconsistent with mainstream science for which time as becoming is an il-
lusion, since the equations of motion do not have a privileged direction. This is not the 
case with open systems in which negative entropy is being transformed with increase 
of entropy. Their development is irreversible. Rosen, by privileging open systems over 
closed systems is in a much stronger position to account for the temporality of life. And 
unusually, he has examined senescence and mortality in organisms.91 
To account for the experience of meaning, however, something more than merely 
durational becoming is required. Being-in-the-world or taking a position involves, as 
Jonas pointed out, transcendence of some kind. In Kant, the transcendental ego stands 
outside the time through which it organizes the sensory manifold. Bergson, Husserl and 
the phenomenologists appreciated that experience is more complicated than this dual-
ism allows for. It is necessary to appreciate that experience involves multiple levels of an-
ticipation and retention to account for the sense of enduring self-hood temporally tran-
scending the immediate situation. This in turn requires that there be multiple levels of 
durational becoming if the ontological status of this experience is to be taken seriously. 
Rosen did grapple with this issue, suggesting in an interview about his work on an-
ticipatory systems and complexity not long before he died:
You have to have more than one time scale, more than one thing that you could 
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call “real time” in an anticipatory system. In my first approaches, the anticipatory 
system was based on predictive models, as I’ve said before. Something in the system 
is running faster than real time in the system, or else you have no anticipation-- the 
system is not anticipating what its own subsequent behavior is going to be. So, you 
have to have more than one inherent time scale.92
It is in dealing with all the implications of this that Rosen’s apparent failure to deal ad-
equately with levels of organization at different scales and their relationships becomes 
manifest. However, Ron Cottam, Willy Ranson and Roger Vounckx who pointed out 
weaknesses in Rosen’s characterization of hierarchy, have argued that Rosen’s ideas 
on relational biology can be modified to give a place to scalar hierarchies.93 At the 
same time, they have rejected Rosen’s binary separation of assemblies into mechanisms 
and organisms and called for a threefold segregation so that the organism is seen as 
the complex interface between its structural aspect or mechanism and ecosystem. With 
this modification, Rosen’s work fully supports Uexküll’s and the philosophical biologists’ 
characterization of living beings as inseparable from their surrounding worlds, and, as-
sociated with this, Uexküll’s argument that organization of life transcends its material 
instantiations. As Uexküll put it:
Imagine that we had a number of living bells, each capable of producing a different 
tone. With these we could make chimes. The bells could be operated either 
mechanically, electrically or chemically, since each living bell would responds to 
each kind of stimulus with its own “ego-quality” [ich-ton]. … Chimes composed 
of living bells must possess the capacity to let their tune resound, not only because 
they are driven by mechanical impulses, but also because they are governed by a 
melody. In this manner, each ego-quality would induce the next one, in accordance 
with the prescribed tone-sequence created by the melody.94 
 This clearly accords with Rashevsky’s and Rosen’s argument that life itself has to be un-
derstood at its own level, with the significant components being products of the system 
rather than being the separable parts into which the organism can be broken down. 
When Rosen’s argument is combined with Cottam et.al.’s arguments that it is necessary 
to see the organism with its mechanisms within its ecosystem to comprehend it, then 
we can see that the meaningful world of the organism in relation to which it positions 
itself as a subject, is a product of this whole system of the organism within its ecosystem. 
Living beings must be appreciated in their own terms, defining and transcending their 
surrounding worlds, and cannot be identified or explained in terms of interactions be-
tween independently identifiable physical components or processes. 
Yet not even Rosen’s treatment of life captures the experience of an organism threat-
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ened with death. Temporality as lived, as creative advance into the future characterized 
by real novelty, and temporality that brings new systems and new kinds of system into 
existence, is something more than and deeper than can be represented by even com-
plex mathematical models. It is here that the semantic dimension of what is modelled 
as something more and richer than its model is most pronounced. It is here the limits of 
mathematical modelling are reached. Creative becoming cannot be fully represented 
through mathematics, even the kind of mathematical models developed by Rosen. The 
very nature of mathematics is to objectify and pre-specify what is possible. It cannot 
grant a place to real creativity.95  However, the ‘objective’, that which can be grasped 
through mathematics, can be seen to have a place in this creative becoming if it is un-
derstood relationally as a product of the co-becoming of processes of differing durations. 
That is, considered in relation to Rosen’s arguments, the semantic aspects of being that 
cannot be reduced to syntax are not merely referents, but can only be fully appreciated 
in relation to the appreciation of being as a multi-leveled process of becoming involv-
ing real creativity. To do justice to the experience of mortality, to memory of the past, 
imaginative responses to the present and to creative advance into the future it is neces-
sary to complement even the most advanced mathematical modelling with polyphonic 
stories.96 
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